

## SUMMARY

The present volume of the *Ethos* is entitled *The Drama of Judas* and it is supposed to offer the reader a wide exploration of the various fields of human unfaithfulness. In Western culture, the biblical Judas is generally considered to have provided the archetype of betrayal, and so an analysis of his act of betrayal towards Jesus, of which we get rather scarce information, is a good point of departure for asking such questions as: What is the essence of betrayal? Do unfaithfulness and betrayal manifest the same moral reality? What causes betrayal? Does the term “betrayal” pertain to a direct act or rather to a process? In which fields of human life does betrayal manifest itself in the most evident way? In which of them has it proved to be most dangerous? What are the consequences of betrayal, both to the one who commits it and to those towards whom it is committed?

The authors of the articles included in the present volume debate such matters as life in truth, self-deceit, irreversibility of betrayal and human capability to do good and to do evil. Unfaithfulness and betrayal unveil what some philosophers have termed “moral contingency” of the human being, which can be counted among the most mysterious aspects of our human condition. It may have been precisely the experience of this type of contingency that St. Paul meant while speaking about having been given “a thorn in the flesh” (2 Co 12:7).

Thus the text *From the Editors* is devoted primarily to the moral phenomenology of betrayal. The authors point to the fact that truth, discovered and asserted in an act of conscience, is itself the value that determines human identity and constitutes the “moral heart” of the human person. Every act of conscience generates the normative power of truth in binding truthfulness with duty. Therefore every act of faithfulness to the truth one has recognized, and thus to one’s own identity, is in a way equivalent to expressing a promise. It may be a promise given to things on the level of their being, or a promise made to a human person in the field of moral duty: a promise made to oneself (to one’s own ethos), to one’s spouse, family, profession or homeland. Therefore a breach of truth, a drastic falsification of one’s own anthropological sense, deserves the qualification of betrayal. In this sense betrayal denotes active opposition to a value in which one has put one’s belief. For this reason betrayal must be seen in the first instance as deceit: since betrayal expresses negation of one’s own identity in consequence of one’s unfaithfulness to the truth one has grasped, its primary essence is self-deceit. A particularly dangerous form of betrayal, and thus a dangerous type of deceit, occurs in the sphere of the word, namely in the field of broadly understood culture. A betrayal of the word is a flagrant betrayal committed towards human persons and towards culture as such. It results in changing a statesman into a demagogue, a writer into a servant to the regime, and an educator into a manipulator. In consequence, the person responsible for this form of betrayal becomes a correlate of his own ambition or of an ideology, thus departing from his humanity.

In the extracts from the Encyclical Letter *Dominum et Vivificantem*, the Holy Father John Paul II stresses that sin – also the sin of betrayal – in its original reality takes place in man’s will and



conscience. Man's original disobedience presupposes a rejection, or at least a turning away from the truth contained in the Word of God. This disobedience in the mystery of the beginning presupposes in a certain sense the same "non-faith" which was to be repeated in the Paschal Mystery. Thus the essence of any disobedience lies in an act of rejection of truth, while every such act is committed as an effect of the temptation that comes from the "father of lies." Therefore, at the root of human sin is the lie which is a radical rejection of the truth contained in the Word of the Father. One can say that the sin of the human beginning consists in untruthfulness, in unfaithfulness to the Word and in the rejection of the gift and of the love which determine the beginning of the world and of man.

Card. Joseph Ratzinger reflects on the paradox of beauty: a paradox that does not convey a contradiction. Christianity calls for such a new understanding of beauty. The Bible says about Christ, "Of all men you are the most handsome, / gracefulness is a dew upon your lips" (Ps 45:3), but also "He had no form or charm to attract us, no beauty to win our hearts" (Is 53:2). Can one thus say that beauty is truth or is it rather the case that it is ugliness that leads us to the truth about the reality? Christianity reveals that the beauty of truth involves suffering, pain, and even the dark mystery of death. Indeed, beauty can be found only in an acceptance of suffering and not regardless of it. Beauty hurts, but through this it awakens man to his highest destiny. As such, beauty enables the highest form of cognition, since it is through beauty that man experiences truth in its fullness. This kind of experience, the experience of the paradoxical beauty of Christ, results in the cognition that is deeper and more real than purely rational deduction. Thus, the true apology of Christianity, the proof of its validity, lies not only in the saints who, with their lives, have given testimony to Christ, but also in the beauty that was born out of their faith. The beauty of love shows that the ultimate dimension of the world is in truth, and not in falsehood. Fake beauty does not awaken in man the yearning for the unspoken or the desire to abandon one's self for its sake. On the contrary, it awakens desire, the will to power or to pleasure. One must follow Dostoevsky's adage that beauty will save the world.

The dialogue between Pharisee Nicodemus, who came to Jesus by night and asked "How can anyone who is already old be born?" (J 3:4), is an occasion for Tadeusz Styczeń, SDS, to reflect on the nature of the liberation of man which by no means lies in one's identification with a socially significant role. Although one may have apparently achieved the peak of one's identity, and even experience self-exaltation having assumed the role of a servant towards others, one's only true identity fully reveals itself in the experience of guilt or unfaithfulness. It is precisely in this type of universal human experience that one clearly observes that one's self is by no means reducible to one's social function, which can be taken over by others, yet without annulling one's guilt. Thus the mistake of Nicodemus lies in his reduction of the significance of Christ to the role He was supposed to play in the history of the Jewish people. Indeed, politics seen as service paid to others is a serious human matter. Yet to reduce the matter of man to a political case would mean to betray man, and so to violate the genuine service to others that politics is supposed to be. There can be no liberation unless its proponents get themselves liberated in truth first, unless they regain the independence and sovereignty of their conscience, unless they renounce untruth and abandon life in self-deceit. In answer to the question asked by Nicodemus one may say that to be born again means to live in truth.

Kazimierz Krajewski investigates the human experience that can be seen as foundational for ethics. The essence of this experience is the phenomenon of moral duty present in the human conscience and simultaneously being the source of human self-transcendence. Indeed, moral experience is bound in a particular way with human experience as such: the experience of moral duty is even tantamount to self-recognition. The reason is that any cognitive act (which manifests the fundamental mode of human existence) – due to the assertion that is inherent in it – involves moral cognition. The experience of a spontaneous approval of an objective state of affairs recognized by the subject in a cognitive act comes fully to light in a situation when one is challenged to question the recognized truth. It is then that man discovers his capability of renouncing what he has himself



asserted. It is also then that the normative power of the truth that he has recognized himself is unfolded before him together with the conviction that to question the truth he has recognized with his own cognitive act would mean to destroy himself as the subject of this act. Such an experience of truth is foundational for the constitution of man as person, for his discovery of his subjectivity and of his personal dignity, which makes him both a witness to truth and one responsible for it. Renunciation of truth leads to a breach in the subject by causing his alienation and self-destruction, at the same time undermining his identity, which ultimately results in the experience of guilt, whose drama consists in man's inability to liberate himself from it. While facing his guilt, man faces his helplessness. The reason is the existential nature of guilt: by doing evil, man becomes evil himself. The experience of guilt reveals how deeply the moral sphere enters the structure and constitution of the human person. Yet guilt is not merely a moral evil. It also expresses sinfulness and renunciation of the Creator. One can say that the problem of guilt cannot be solved within the domain of ethics, as man himself is not in power to annihilate his guilt. In this sense ethics becomes a *pre-ambulum fidei*, it is a waiting for the "Good News," and as such it becomes a philosophy of advent. It opens man – the subject of guilt – to the solution offered to him by the Revelation. The field of reason (*ratio*) and the field of the faith (*fides*) turn out to be complementary against the background of the moral experience.

John F. Crosby in turn examines the privation theory of evil and argues that some kinds of evil cannot be possibly explained in terms of this theory. The reason is that in certain cases one cannot point to the subject of the privation in question, to the being that is wounded, and thus we encounter a paradoxical idea of an evil that seems to lack any real "bearer." Simultaneously it might seem that if the evil of some devastation is only broad and vast enough (e.g. in the case of the complete destruction of life on earth), then there is no evil at all. Although such an evil is not an evil in the sense of privation as there remains no being that is wounded, it nevertheless falls outside of the explanatory reach of the privation theory, which therefore cannot be a universal theory of evil. Also suffering acute pain cannot be interpreted merely in terms of a lack of the feeling of wellness as this absence does not equal the whole reality of the pain. On a similar basis, most kinds of moral evil refuse to fit so conveniently into the privation theory. There are obvious cases in which the principle of badness in the crime cannot be grasped in terms of privation (e.g. privation of love in the case of deliberate murder). In such cases it does not suffice to hold that the will by its nature always aims at some objective good (*bonum*), or at least at something taken as an objective good (*bonum apparens*). The will, in addition to being drawn to *bonum*, can also be drawn to what is merely subjectively satisfying for the person. The will, then, has an alternative to the *ratio boni*, namely the *ratio* of the merely subjectively satisfying. Even if there is a lack here, namely a lack of interest in *bonum*, in such cases there is more than privation. This thesis is in a way confirmed by St. Thomas, who holds that while the evil of punishment is explained in terms of the privation of some due good, the evil of moral fault is explained in terms of a contrary opposition to the good, and for this reason such evil is declared to be the worse evil. Proponents of the privation theory of evil are nevertheless right in holding that evil is a negation of good, that privation is connected with moral evil in this sense, that moral evil in a person always leads to a diminishment of that person's being. Yet although every case of moral evil includes a lack of some respect that we owe the good, often enough, and always in the more malevolent cases of moral evil, one cannot take the whole measure of evil in terms of privation.

Andrzej Póltawski argues, against some Thomists, that the concept of value does not necessarily involve depreciation of the good, but is applicable as a closer designation of its particular variants. It is not the case that the notion of value expresses detachment from being or abandonment of the teleological approach to the existing reality. Indeed, in the common sense approach the good, as well as the other transcendental qualities of the reality, are understood as values. The approach to the good as a transcendental quality, expressed in the scholastic adage: *ens et bonum convertuntur*, has been frequently referred to also by philosophers interested in the ontology of



values, in particular by Dietrich von Hildebrand, who introduced the categories of importance and of the subjectively satisfying in reference to values and stressed the existence of “values in themselves,” as well as by John F. Crosby, who by reference to Hildebrand, has carried out a careful critical analysis of the Thomistic *bonum*, thus summing up the classic understanding of the good in the scholastic thought. Dwelling on Hildebrand’s approach, Crosby stresses that in the metaphysical sense the value is stronger than the good itself. The value demands a proper response (which constitutes its possibly deepest essential definition), and this quality, at least in reference to moral values, bears a mark of absoluteness. Póltawski holds that in order to explain why this mark of absoluteness is carried by some values and not by others, one needs to introduce certain corrections to what Hildebrand describes as important in itself or as value in the exact and proper sense of the term. A significant contribution to this field can be found in Adam Rodziński’s consideration of Christian philosophy as personalism. Within the personalist approach it becomes evident that the value of the human person has a special position in a sense that is stronger than Hildebrand’s “importance-in-itself.” Only human persons are *par excellence* valuable, that is valuable in the metaphysical sense. A similar observation was made by Giovanni Reale, who points to the fact that Christianity has provided a new metaphysical paradigm, namely, the metaphysics of the person in which the human person is seen as a value in a more fundamental sense than anything else termed as valuable, while all the other values by necessity refer to the person as their source.

The succeeding block of texts is entitled *The Biblical Judas* and comprises reflections on the image of Judas that can be found in the writings of the New Testament.

The section opens with an article by Bp. Jan B. Szlaga, who analyzes the references to the figure Judas in the New Testament. Judas accompanies Jesus throughout His Passion, although his participation in the events which the other Apostles fully live through is only partial: he is not witness to the fulfillment of the Passion and he is not given the honour to welcome the risen Jesus. Among the possible reasons why he betrayed Jesus were his false interpretation of the teaching of Christ and his perception of Jesus as a false prophet, but most probably also his fear of suffering and death. One can ponder whether the betrayal committed by Judas was part of God’s plan of salvation or whether it was Jesus or rather the case Jesus was Witness to that Judas betrayed. Was he an accidental traitor? The tragedy of Judas lies in the fact that he was never able to grasp fully the Grace given to him by Jesus. He never fully identified himself with the apostolate Jesus had offered him. The Apostle Peter also betrayed Christ, yet he cried bitterly on seeing his Master condemned to death, when he realized what he had done. Unlike Peter, Judas was unable to ask forgiveness, and so his ultimate fate was not love and reconciliation, but despair and death.

A similar subject is explored by Hubert Ordon, SDS, who observes that the mysterious figure of Judas, his motives and the stages of the betrayal he had committed were considered already in the Church of the Apostles. Modern exegetes, however, agree in saying that Judas first departed his Master spiritually, and then definitely abandoned Him in Gethsemane, at the beginning of Christ’s Passion. Although greed and selfishness are seen as the most prominent ones among the possible motives of his act of betrayal, some exegetes point to the suggestion present in the Gospels that the true reason for his ignoble deed was his inner breakdown and his loss of faith in the divine mission of Jesus as well as his disappointment with his Master’s attitude that did not meet the expectations of Israel Iscariot had shared. Judas probably conspired with the Sanhedrin, yet the inner change that took place in him after Jesus was arrested, his repentance, the attempt to compensate for the harm he had done, the regret caused by the failure of his efforts that culminated in his desperate ultimate move point that he might have been cheated by his accomplices. Thus one can suspect that Judas was a tool in the hands of the political opponents of Jesus who pointed to and exaggerated the “danger” in which the activity of Christ might put Israel. They cleverly implicated Judas in their plot. Such an interpretation, while not diminishing Judas’s fault or his responsibility for the committed act of betrayal, nevertheless reveals a frequently used mechanism and method of involving a human person in evil.



Jacek Salij, OP, reflects on the nature of betrayal which appears to be rather abandonment of people one is committed to and by whom one is trusted than abandonment of ideas. Also such an abandonment of the beloved persons which results in their loss is betrayal. One commits betrayal not only due to the trouble involved in remaining faithful, but also because of the lack of interest in the fate of those one is betraying. It frequently happens that committing betrayal involves much more trouble than overcoming the temptation. A particularly despicable form of betrayal involves abandoning one's friends, joining one's enemy and acting against one's friends. However, in the case of Judas we deal with an act of betrayal showing some distinctive qualities. Firstly, the betrayer made recourse to deceit and pretence, although the Betrayed One consciously allowed the betrayal to take place. Secondly, by his betrayal Judas subjected Jesus to an unjust and unimaginable humiliation, yet he did not make Jesus lose anything. Thirdly, although the betrayer put the absolutely innocent Jesus to death, Jesus did not cease to love him and considered him as a friend of His even at the moment the betrayal was being committed. This perspective acquires an extreme intensiveness if in the agonizing suffering of Jesus we perceive the image of the mysterious suffering of love that is inflicted upon God due to our sinfulness. The modern mentality has accepted a paradigm in which the faith is merely an expression of one's outlook upon the world, and thus a loss of the faith is treated as a simple change in one's views. According to another modern idea, the reason why people change their outlook upon the world is intellectual honesty, so one cannot point to morally wrong reasons for abandoning the faith without violating the freedom of conscience. However, these modern conceptions overlook the fact that the faith precedes the outlook upon the world and it involves faithfulness to God as its foundation. In this light, a departure from the faith is seen as the departure of the prodigal son from his father, it hurts God, cuts man off from Life and puts him to death. Thus the faith can never be reduced to cherishing particular convictions, and it involves faithfulness to Christ before faithfulness to any idea.

In his homily delivered on Holy Thursday 2004 David Sullivan, MAfr, speaks about the guests invited by Jesus to the Last Supper. One of them was Judas, who later was to betray his Master. Yet he had started off so well. Jesus had trusted him and had invited him to join the select group of the Twelve. But something had caused him to change. We don't know for sure what it was: money, discouragement or disappointment? But whatever caused Judas to fall could also change us. Peter was another of Jesus' guests. Events were to show that he was a weak person. Some hours after the Last Supper he too betrayed his Master. However, what distinguished him from Judas was the fact that he admitted his sin, returned to Jesus and repented. The other disciples, Jesus' guests at this meal, were also weak people. When Jesus was arrested, they fled. However, the Spirit transformed them into people on whom Jesus was to build His Church. We are Jesus' guests today. We too are weak, and yet Jesus believes in us, as He believed in His disciples and can transform us, as He transformed them, into people on whom He can build His Church in today's world. Yet we must beware of not falling into the same trap as Judas.

The next section is entitled *The Image of Judas* and it comprises articles on the representations of Judas in various art forms.

Małgorzata U. Mazurczak analyzes the most characteristic contexts in which the figure of Judas appears in Medieval, Renaissance and Baroque European painting. Judas is shown either as a participant in the Last Supper, while leaving the Upper Room (as a rule, only eleven disciples are shown as participating in the institution of the Eucharist by Christ) or during his act of betrayal in the Garden of Gethsemane. It is interesting that Judas is usually shown as sinful and fallen, but not as damned. Only sporadically, however, is his image related to that of Satan. Judas is frequently associated with yellow attire, yellow being the colour of betrayal, and with a money-belt. The figure of Judas appears in a most characteristic way in paintings of such artists as Lorenzo Monaco, Cosimo Rosselli, Justus of Ghent, Nicolo Poussin, Jan van Dyck, Rembrandt van Rijn, Nicolò di Liberatore, Andrea del Castagno, Leonardo da Vinci, Giovanni Battista Tiepolo, Philipp de Champaigne, Mathieu Le Main. It is interesting, however, that only Rembrandt van Rijn, by



showing Judas returning the thirty pieces of silver, has expressed hope for God's forgiveness to the betrayer. In European painting, representations of the betrayal of Judas are complemented with images of Peter's grief and remorse (particularly in paintings by Giovanni Francesco Barbieri, Giovanni Lanfranco, Gerard Seghers, Giuseppe Antonio Petri Petri).

Also Bożena Fabiani analyzes representations of Judas in European painting, describing in detail the scenes presenting Judas in frescos by Giotto di Bondone, in paintings by Duccio di Buoninsegna, Andrea del Castagno, Cosimo Rosselli, Domenico Ghirlandaio, Justus of Ghent and Luca Signorelli. While depicting Judas, the artists would choose only certain motifs from the Gospel, disregarding others, as for instance the scene in which Jesus warns Judas about the tragic consequences of his betrayal (cf. Mt 26:40). Also in this article Rembrandt van Rijn is shown as a psychologist among painters, depicting the betrayer in his *Judas Returning the Thirty Pieces of Silver* as a despaired, unhappy and tragic one. In Leonardo da Vinci's *Last Supper*, the gestures of the Apostles express their astonishment at the news that one of them is to betray Jesus. Judas' hands in the painting reflect the biblical "here with me on the table is the hand of the man who is betraying me" (Lk 22:21).

Anna Różycka Bryzek analyzes the presentations of Judas in the 14th century frescos in the Holy Trinity Chapel in the Lublin Castle. The Chapel itself is one of the most important and most precious monuments both in Poland and in Europe. Russian painters, headed by Master Andrew, covered the interior walls and the ceiling of the temple with paintings according to an iconographic programme of Eastern Christianity. The Passion cycle comprises fifteen chronological scenes. It is interesting that Judas is shown as accompanied by the devil: both when he leaves the Upper Room and when he plots with the Sanhedrin. What is more, Satan is shown as a dangerous opponent in a spiritual duel, thus pointing to Judas' tragic moral dilemma. It is worth observing that the Castle Chapel in Lublin is the only place in which Byzantine painting presents a personalized image of Satan tempting Judas.

The next section is entitled *Faithfulness, Betrayal and Truth* and it is devoted to the presentation of faithfulness and betrayal in various fields of human life.

Barbara Chyrowicz, SSpS, reflects on the process of the loss of moral sensitivity which results from a gradual weakening of faithfulness to the once-accepted norms of action. Subsequent exceptions to the accepted rules of moral behaviour result in an easier self-justification and in finding the breaking of norms less objectionable. The more exceptions, the less remorse and the stronger the tendency to cross other barriers that seemed inviolable a short while ago. The tendency to abandon – as a result of a "small steps" strategy – the area that was once considered as unquestionable appears not only in the field of morality, it is also characteristic of the process of making case law and of the education process. However, the moral risk involved in the logic of exceptions, which is triggered off by consent to departure from ethical norms, seems most dangerous since it may be bound with endangering a fundamental good of the human person, for instance the health or the lives of others. The ultimate source of moral sensitivity lies in the recognition of the good. Therefore, when gradual acceptance of the norms that have so far been rejected starts to spread throughout a community that has abandoned the recognized truth about the good, one can say that the loss of moral sensitivity acquires a social dimension. This phenomenon is particularly characteristic of the moral acceptance of the advance in biomedicine. Although acceptance of the destruction of a human life in one particular instance may not necessarily lead to a mass destruction of life, it is nevertheless bound to weaken our moral sensitivity to the violation of the good of human life in general. In this context, the role of moralists and of moral authorities gains a special significance: they can act either towards strengthening or towards weakening moral sensitivity in the community.

Wojciech Chudy holds that betrayal in the sphere of culture or in the sphere of the word consists in the abuse of the value that is essential in it, namely, of truth. History shows men of letters as particularly prone to deceit and to betrayal of the word, for which they are supposed to hold



responsibility. This group includes writers, poets, literary critics, journalists, film makers, artists and all those who are supposed to be establishing the relation of adequacy between the sign and the reality. The ethos of an artist or of a man of letters consists in the language of truth, in openness, freedom and in the moral stance that testifies to truth. Particularly acute cases of betrayal of the word took place in the communist Poland. Intellectuals, among them renowned poets and writers (e.g. S. J. Lec, J. Tuwim, S. Różewicz, W. Szymborska), would frequently violate their ethos by becoming functionaries of the regime in return for privileges and gratifications. Their output of that period shows degeneration of the language, in particular of its communicative function, a false image of the reality and acceptance of a "double measure," i.e. separation of the artistic form from the content of the work. In general one can say that the deceitful attitude of those intellectuals consisted in their having put the political system or the ideology above their mission of artists. The mechanisms of deceit included: servitude, corruption, weakness, fascination with power, political involvement, insufficient self-criticism and idealistic pragmatism.

Anna Kawalec undertakes the problem of faithfulness of the theatre to the human person. On the one hand, the article shows an attempt at demythologization of the theatre as well as a polemic with the indiscriminate acceptance (especially by the artistic circles) of the (mainly modernist) thesis that the theatre, by its essence, enjoys a special position: "The theatre is a temple." "The creator is a priest." On the other hand, the article offers a constructive proposal of the conception of the theatre, dwelling on the realistic philosophy, particularly on the ancient category of *mimesis* combined with a personalist approach to man. In this perspective man as person (as both creator and spectator) is perceived as the essence of the theatre. This fact determines the unique nature of the theatre and in a way also its sacral character. The second part of the reflections includes a presentation of various models of the theatre and their characteristics, as seen from the perspective of the main thesis of the article, as well as an analysis of K. S. Stanisławski's approach to the theatre, which is probably the closest to the mimetic model. The third part of the text refers to some chosen problems of modern art, in particular to the problems of modern theatre, such as e.g. provocation. In conclusion, it is stressed that each human work bears the personal dimension of its creator as its mark, thus assuming a moral shape. Both the creator and the spectator are responsible for the theatre, for its service to the perfecting of the human person.

Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik considers the shapes of the phenomenon of betrayal in the field of science, namely, betrayal of the true objective of science, betrayal of the academic community, and betrayal of the society in which science is pursued. It is demonstrated that a betrayal of any of these three elements involves a betrayal of the remaining two. However, all these modes of betrayal in science culminate in the betrayal of the binding nature of truth: scientists ignore their own cognitive judgments and recognitions about the reality. Truth becomes subordinated to their will. Among the ultimate consequences of the betrayal of truth are: a betrayal of man, self-betrayal, violence done to one's own intellect, treachery and harm done both to the one who commits betrayal and to the one towards whom the betrayal is committed. In the case of science one can enumerate four types of betrayal: forgery (subordination of the cognitive results to some personal or institutional goals), plagiarism (presenting the results obtained by someone else as one's own or assuming unjustified authorship) and other forms of violation of the academic community (illegal research funding or blocking someone's promotion), developing anti-science (renunciation of human rationality), and morally unacceptable research (e.g. experimenting on human persons who have not agreed to it). The most dangerous form of betrayal of truth in science questions the moral dimension of research and poses the threat of a cultural suicide of humanity.

Marek Olejniczak undertakes the problem of vocation to medical professions and by pointing to the distinctive elements of a vocation as such, and designating the range of a professional vocation, contrasts a professional vocation with a mere fulfillment of duties. The notion of vocation can be interpreted in the light of the concept of *ethos* introduced by Max Scheler, who held that the primary cognition of the world derives from emotions. Thus each person has his or her own order



of love (*ordo amoris*) that determines the person's individual destination which can be seen as the person's vocation. Acute sensitivity to suffering and perception of a negative value in suffering can inspire a person to undertake a medical profession. Thus, love for others as well as the desire to act for the sake of the suffering are pre-conditions of a medical vocation.

Fr. Jerzy Kułaczkowski explores the topic of marital infidelity, as it seen in the teaching of Old Testament prophets from before the Babylonian captivity, namely, Hosea and Jeremiah. In the Old Testament, marriage, perceived as a covenant between a man and a woman, was considered the basis of a good functioning of the society. As Prophet Hosea demonstrates on the example of his own marriage to an unfaithful woman, the husband's love for his wife is an encouragement to fidelity, and it can be seen as reflecting the relationship between God and Israel, which has not always been faithful to her Lord. In the perspective of Jeremiah, on the other hand, marital infidelity is seen as harm done by an unfaithful wife to her husband. Again, the disloyal wife symbolizes the unfaithful Israel, which by rejecting the love of her God not only broke the covenant, but humiliated her Lord. However, while Hosea condemns marital infidelity in a severe prosecutor manner, Jeremiah, himself unmarried, presents the position of a husband who is hurt in his love and unjustly harmed. Still, the duty of the betrayed husband is to defend the sacred nature of marriage. Both prophets stress in their texts the dignity of marriage in order to strengthen the faith of the Jewish nation, and to teach that the faith must not have a purely formal character, but it must be based on a living experience of God.

The following section is entitled *Faithfulness in the World of Persons*.

Rocco Buttiglione reflects on the relationship between politics and human suffering. According to St. Augustine, the primary reason for pursuing politics is the necessity to oppose evil. St. Thomas Aquinas, however, adds that there exists another dimension of the political reality, namely, the necessity of man's cooperation with others in order to realize his own good. Thus politics comprises some of the social activities that man undertakes in his life, as well as his cooperation with others that is indispensable in order to realize the non-antagonistic public or common good. In order to achieve this good a political community must be formed. One of the tasks of politics is to mediate between natural law and power, yet politics is not always in the position to protect natural law. This is where the pain or the cross of politics lies. Democracy is handicapped in the sense that it cannot guarantee obedience to natural law, yet no other political system can provide the support of power for truth. The main task of a politician is to work patiently on winning support for truth. Although the sphere of politics is directed towards truth, it is continuously hindered by human concupiscence, by the desire for personal benefit and by the will to power. An important issue in the democratic system is that of aesthetic education of the society so that it will show sensitivity to the good and to beauty.

Fr. Michel Schooyans argues that a State that has legalized abortion and is to legalize euthanasia actually introduces a distinction between the human beings that are allowed the right to life and those who are refused this right. Such a State demonstrates a totalitarian attitude in questioning the equal human dignity of all the human persons. The background of the introduction of the new undemocratic bills is a voluntarist conception of law, based rather on consensus than on the truth about the human person. Facing this situation, legislators and politicians who do not assume the attitude of conscientious objectors become active accomplices in the crime of deliberate murder, as it was the case with the Nazi leaders and doctors who expressed solidarity with crime by being obedient to unjust laws and orders, and who were proved guilty of not having shown civil disobedience.

Joaquín Navarro-Valls, referring to the output of St. Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer, considers the question of sanctity, as it should be understood in modern times. In short, one can say that a saint is a person who having discovered God's project concerning him- or herself, does not hinder the realization of this project, but has made it his or her own and has remained faithful to it. In the Catholic theology, such a project is called a vocation, which means that it is seen as a calling to



achieve a reality that transcends the human person and involves the presence of the grace of God. Still, the calling to sanctity has a universal nature: it is directed to everyone, and each person is called to discover his or her every day life as a place of Christian sanctity. A difficulty that we encounter in this process results above all from the fact that the epoch in which we live has departed from God and has created a culture of the absence of transcendence in which man experiences despair as he is evidently deprived of the true basis of his existence. Paradoxically, one can say that sanctity in modern times consists in perseverance in the attitude of seeking for what is divine in the world of human matters. Such an attitude expresses one's cooperation with God.

Tomasz Górką analyzes the concepts of participation and alienation in the philosophy of Karol Wojtyła. The essence of various dimensions of participation is one's involvement in the humanity of others. Alienation is in turn perceived as a refusal to participate, as a rejection of one's participation in the community of which one is a member, and as such it is perceived as a betrayal of one's community. Yet alienation is not destructive merely for the community, but it affects its subject in the first place, as an alienated person is unable to realize his or her own humanity.

The succeeding section bears the title *Faithfulness of the Word and Faithfulness to the Word*.

Andrzej Stoff considers the meaning of betrayal in relation to literature and shows the particular fields of literature in which this phenomenon is manifested. The primary source of betrayal committed by literature lies in abuse of the freedom of artistic creation which can happen in any period of history, and which is paradoxically easier and frequently even unnoticeable in non-oppressive systems in which participation in culture consists rather in consumption of certain goods than in a pursuit of values. The most dangerous manifestations of betrayal committed by literature involve aestheticization of evil, putting aesthetics over and above ethics by providing an aesthetic alibi for presenting and propagating evil or a nihilist attitude. Other substantial forms of betrayal on the part of literature consist in offering support to deceit or to falsehood (as opposed to error), but they can be seen also in an inaccurate presentation of tradition or in an ideologization of the past. Such attitudes, in particular if they serve to manifest banalization of evil, do not remain indifferent to the readers' perception of the real world and deprive them of an opportunity to recognize the truth about the reality. All these forms of betrayal ultimately result from a wrong conception of literature that involves an anthropological error: deriving the creative process from a wrong understanding of the human person and thus from wrong metaphysical presumptions. In consequence, literature is reduced to its aesthetic dimension and it no longer serves to harmonize the experience of being with the human needs. In the face of these destructible phenomena a particular responsibility falls on editors and literary historians, whose task is to pursue the true objectives of literary criticism.

Ryszard Zajaczkowski describes three twentieth century literary representations of Judas, based on his biblical description: the one presented in K. H. Rostworowski's drama *Judas z Kariothu* [Judas of Karioth], in Roman Brandstaetter's *Jezus z Nazarethu* [Jesus from Nazareth], and in W. Osajca's poetic cycle *Naszyjnik Umiłowanego* [The Necklace of the Beloved]. The scarce biblical description of Judas provides an opportunity for a vast and differentiated literary interpretation of this protagonist and of his actions. Thus the mentioned authors present various hypotheses as to the social and professional identity of Judas, as to his first meeting with Jesus Christ, the motives of the betrayal he committed, and they differently approach the question of the involvement of Satan in his act of betrayal. Finally, the three authors consider the question of the salvation of Judas: Osajca expresses hope for the salvation of all men, including Judas. It is interesting that the twentieth century literature has abandoned simplified images of Judas, who is no longer perceived as a demonic murderer, an object of hatred or a criminal whose deed merely reveals the greatness of the redemptive power of God's love. On the contrary, modern art shows the mystery of Judas as reaching the innermost depth of the human spirit, and the tragic Apostle



seems to epitomize the dilemmas and the pursuits characteristic of our time and of modern man. In a way, he remains a symbol of an attempt at a deeper understanding of the mission of Christ.

Andrzej Kopiński writes about the legendary controversy between Czesław Miłosz and Andrzej Trzebiński held in the occupied Poland during the Second World War. According to Trzebiński, Miłosz advocated Conradian ethics of faithfulness and honour in which the human person is the source of moral duty. Such an approach, argued Trzebiński, resulted in a passive attitude to history. The moment of history, however, demanded active involvement in the historical process and excluded withdrawal to the sphere of ideas in pursuit of the sense of the events. The approach represented by Miłosz, in Trzebiński's opinion, was brought about by the feelings of fear and helplessness towards the Nazi dominance over the entire continent. Against the principle of non-violence, which was considered by Miłosz and other intellectuals as the way to perfection, Trzebiński held that the escape to the sphere of absolute reasons (metaphysics) would manifest an act of pretence. In that particular moment of history metaphysics must not be limited by the principle "Thou shalt not kill": although violence and inflicting pain on others could hardly be considered as good, the moment of history demanded a recourse to such means in order to defend human lives, freedom and dignity. To Trzebiński, the attitude represented by Miłosz was a perfect alibi for egoists and cowards, and it ultimately resulted in waiting in abeyance for the end of the disaster.

Małgorzata Mikołajczak reflects on the cultural motifs and religious symbols which are present in the output of Zbigniew Herbert. Herbert held that art should exclude any exhibitionism, and thus the characteristics of his poetry are distance, an anti-biographical and anti-psychological attitude, sympathy, irony and mythical references. Indeed, sympathy is perceived by Herbert as the daimonion of creativity. The main task of the literary work is to face up to the reality, to remain faithful to it. Patterns of culture work as a mirror – they let the reader perceive himself in them. The poem *Dedalus and Icarus* expresses the experience of the fall which is inherent in the human condition. Herbert gives various names to the human fate, the most characteristic ones being: shadow, separation, exile, departure, homelessness and abandonment. His poetry and prose reveal the poet's discovery of limitation and simultaneously a discovery of an enormous potential of the human being. Suffering is ascribed a special significance within this artistic vision: pain is seen as binding man to life and reminding him about the imperative to endure his fate bravely. The motif of suffering is accompanied by the poet's conviction about the necessity of sacrifice, which manifests a link between his output and Christianity. Although sacrifice is bound with suffering, only sacrifice can be a guarantee of salvation and of reconciliation. Herbert's poetry expresses the paradox of the faith in which life is born from death.

The next block comprises personal texts that can be seen as testimonies to faithfulness and betrayal and it is entitled *Our Brother – Judas*.

Waldemar Borzestowski writes about the unavoidable presence of Judas in our lives. Himself an out-of-wedlock child, "a child of infidelity," the author experienced the meaning unfaithfulness already in his childhood. Then, as an adult person, he witnessed the gradual dissolution of his friends' apparently happy and successful marriage. The author stresses that despite many modern interpretations of the figure of Judas, we must remember that in the first instance he was a betrayer, a traitor, a pretender and one who would build his future on deceit and on harm done to others and to himself. The tragedy of our times is that our epoch has eliminated spirituality. Religion, confidence and humility have been replaced by magic and concupiscence, while the dominant feelings are those of emptiness, disappointment and despair. One must pray for Judas as much as one must pray for the Judas present in oneself.

Wanda Półtawska presents a personal reflection on her meeting with a blind girl who was praying for Judas in a graveyard, because "probably no one else prays for him..."

Andrzej Derdziuk, OFM Cap, reflects on the problem of charity in the modern world. John Paul II calls the Christians to undertake works of active love towards others and to perceive the countenance of Christ in the poor and in the needy. Serving Christ through service to the least of



these brothers of His (cf. Mt 25:40) is a way of pursuing creativity in charity. The Christian discovers the mystery of charity in the perpetual enrichment of the world by God. The imagination of charity leads us to the discovery that everything we are in possession of is a gift from God. This discovery generates the feeling of inner peace, trust, forgiveness and reconciliation.

The succeeding section of the volume refers to Mel Gibson's movie *Passion*, which is reviewed by Vittorio Messori and offered a theological commentary by Fr. Jan Sochoń.

The final section of the article part is devoted to the profile of the late Professor Irena Sławińska, eminent Polish scholar who specialized in the study of the theatre. Professor Sławińska was a member of the Research Board of the John Paul II Institute at the Catholic University of Lublin. The section opens with an introduction from the Editors of the *Ethos* which is followed by a Condolence Letter from His Holiness John Paul II to Abp. Józef Życiński on the occasion of the death of Prof. Irena Sławińska, and by the statement of the present Rector of the Catholic University of Lublin Andrzej Szostek, MIC. The introductory part of the section concludes with the homily delivered during Professor Sławińska's funeral by Fr. Wiesław A. Niewęglowski.

The section on the profile of Irena Sławińska is divided into three parts. In the first one, entitled *The Person and the Work*, the authors concentrate on the academic merits of the late Professor, pointing to her independence and to her vocational attitude to the profession she pursued.

The second sub-section is entitled *On the Island of Freedom* and it comprises texts devoted to the academic presence of Prof. Irena Sławińska at the Catholic University of Lublin. The authors characterize the direction of the research carried by and under the supervision of Professor Sławińska, pointing to her intellectual courage and honesty, as well as to her non-compromising attitude and rejection of any kind of opportunism, even during the most difficult years of communism in Poland.

The third sub-section, which bears the title *Meetings* opens with His Holiness John Paul II's Letter of Gratitude for the gift of the book *Świat jako spektakl* [The World as a Performance], a *Festschrift* for Professor Irena Sławińska on the occasion of her 90th birthday. Then the late Professor's colleagues and former students present their impressions from the meetings they had with her at various stages of her life.

The section *Thinking about the Fatherland...* includes a poem by Kazimierz Wierzyński entitled *Litania na Monte Cassino* [Litany on Monte Cassino].

In the standing column *Notes and Reviews* Fr. Jacenty Mastej reviews Fr. H. Witczyk's *Pascha Jezusa odpowiedzią Boga na grzech świata. Eschatologiczna ofiara Ekspiacji i nowego Przymierza* [The Passion of Jesus as God's Response to the Sinfulness of the World. The Eschatological Sacrifice of Expiation and of the New Covenant], Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik presents a lengthy analysis of W. Chudy's *Filozofia kłamstwa. Kłamstwo jako fenomen zła w świecie osób i społeczeństw* [A Philosophy of Falsehood. Falsehood as a Manifestation of Evil in the World of Persons and Communities], Fr. Alfred Wierzbicki reflects on the recently published volumes of Z. Herbert's correspondence: *Korespondencj* (letters to and from H. Elzenberg) and *Korespondencja 1949-1967* (letters to and from J. Zawieyski); Janusz Mocarski reviews Z. Bokszański's *Stereotypy a kultura* [Stereotypes and Culture]; Katarzyna Solecka and Fr. Jerzy Szymik write about the collection *Małe prozy biblijne* [Little Biblical Prose] edited by M. Jasińska-Wojtkowska and M. Nowak; Krzysztof Dybciak reflects on J. Sikora's poetic collection *Demony mieszkają w nas. Wybór wierszy* [Demons Live in Us. A Selection of Poems]; Józef Fert presents A. M. Wierzbicki's poetic collection *Miejsca i twarze* [Places and Faces] and Wojciech Kudyba presents three poetic volumes by J. S. Pasierb: *Puste łąki* [Empty Meadows], *Morze, obłok i kamień* [The Sea, the Cloud and the Stone], *Ten i tamten brzeg* [This and That Shore]. The section concludes with the *Proposals of the Ethos*.

The section devoted to *Reports* includes Roman Majeran's report on a conference on Neoplatonism held at the Catholic University of Lublin, a report by Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik on the 6th International Metaphysical Symposium held at the Catholic of Lublin, a report by Piotr



Ślęczka, SDS, on the session organized in Lublin on the Day for Life in 2004, and a report by Lech Giemza on a research conference devoted to the output of John Paul II which was held at the Catholic University of Lublin.

In the section *The Pontificate in the Eyes of the World* Jarosław Merecki, SDS, analyzes the evolution of the standpoint of the Catholic Church on the admissibility of death penalty, stressing the influence of John Paul II's personalism on the present approach of the Church to the problem of death penalty and on the reformulation of the teaching of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* in that matter.

The section *Through the Prism of the Ethos* includes Mirosława Chuda's feuilleton referring to the movie *Passion*.

The volume concludes with the *Calendar* of the 25th year of the pontificate of John Paul II (by Beata Bogusz), the *Bibliography* of John Paul II's addresses on the subject of truth as commitment (by Tomasz Górka), and the *Notes about the Authors*.

Summarized by *Dorota Chabrajska*